John Duns Scotus: The Divisions of the Essential Order

John Scotus examines the fourfold division of order of being. To make his divisions very clear, he attempts to indicate members of a division and to show that the members actually belong to the division. Contrary to the opinion of those who argue that the posterior is ordered and that the prior transcends order, John Scotus argues that order is a ‘relation which can be affirmed equally of the prior and posterior in regard to each other.’


The First Division

The first division comprises of the two orders: order of eminence and order of dependence. In the order of eminence, a thing is said to be prior if it is more perfect and noble; posterior if it is superseded in perfection. Having recourse to the example of Aristotle, John Scotus claims that act is prior in order of eminence to potency. Since act is prior according to substance and form while potency is posterior according to becoming.

In the order of dependence, what exists essentially and independently is prior whereas what depends on the other for its existence is posterior. The prior can exist without the posterior but the posterior cannot exist without the prior. Even if the prior should produce the posterior necessarily (and as such could not exist without it) still does not mean that the prior requires the posterior for its existence. Without the posterior the existence of the prior can be conceived; such existence cannot be contradictory.  For John Scotus “anything which is essentially posterior depends necessarily upon what is prior but not vice versa, even should the posterior at times proceed from it necessarily.”


The Second Division

The second division is a subdivision of the order of dependence into two separate units. In the first unit, the dependent is something caused and that which it depends is the cause. The dependent is the posterior and that which it depends is the cause. In this order there is a clear demarcation between the caused (posterior) from the cause (prior).

The second unit is more subtle.  Both the dependent and that which it depends have the same cause.  The same cause produces two different effects. The first effect by its natures could be caused before the other. The second effect can be caused only if the first is caused. The first effect is prior while the second effect is posterior.  John Scotus illustrates these two effects with the mind and the state of mind. The mind is caused proximately while the state of mind is caused remotely. The state of mind is posterior and the mind is prior. The state of mind is dependent on the mind. However both have the same cause.

John Duns Scotus labored to show that in the second unit of the second division, “there is an essential dependence of the more remote upon the more proximate effect.”  He proffers three reasons to support his position. First, the second effect which is posterior cannot exist without the first effect which is prior. Second, the fact that the two effects have the same cause affects them according to a certain order and they in turn are ordered to each other essentially because of their individual relations to a mutual cause. Third, the second effect needs only to be considered as the immediate cause of the more proximate effect.


The Third Division

The third division further splits the second unit of the second division (two effects both remote and proximate with one cause). The first part of this division is the immediate effect which is  prior not only ‘when it proceeds more proximately from the immediate cause of the two effects, but also when the common cause is related more remotely to an effect.’  In this division even if the proximate cause of the second effect (e.g. state of mind) is not in any way the cause of the first effect (e.g. mind itself), there is still ‘an essential order based on a priority and posteriority of effects so long as the causality of their common cause is itself related to these effects by an essential order.’

 The second part of this division is the remote effect which is posterior. This remote effect is still an order of essential dependence since “each effect is essentially ordered to some common third which is their mutual cause, it follows that these effects are also essentially ordered to one another.” This remote effect cannot exist without the proximate effect.


The Fourth Division

In this division, the cause in the first unit of the second division is further divided into fourfold part namely, final, efficient, material and formal. The final cause is that which is ordered to an end called finitum. The efficient cause is the author, the mover of a thing. The material cause is what is made from matter called materiatum. The formal cause is what is given form called formatum.